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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. 
 
In April 1995, the ship boom on a vessel owned by 
Transportes Ferreos de Venezuela II CA (TFV) collapsed. 
TFV sued EDC, Inc., the boom's designer and supplier , and 
in August 1998, the parties settled. As part of the 
settlement, EDC agreed to the entry of a $1 million 
judgment against it, in favor of TFV. TFV agr eed not to 
execute this judgment, and in exchange, EDC assigned its 
rights under an insurance contract it held with Hartford 
Fire Insurance Company (Hartford) to TFV . TFV then 
attempted to recover the amount of EDC's $1 million 
settlement from Hartford. The district court found for 
Hartford, holding that Hartford was substantially 
prejudiced by the fact that it was not notified of the 
accident until three years after it happened. W e reverse and 
remand. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Facts 
 
TFV owned two vessels that it used to transport ir on ore: 
the M/V Rio Caroni (a bulk carrier) and the F/T Boca 
Grande (a floating terminal and transfer station). The Rio 
Caroni carried iron ore down the Orinoco River in 
Venezuela from various inland points and, on arrival at the 
mouth of the river, unloaded the ore onto the Boca Grande. 
The Boca Grande then placed the ore on ocean-going 
vessels. 
 
In August 1992, TFV's predecessor, Deltamar S.A., 
entered into a contract with the NKK Corporation for the 
conversion of the Rio Caroni from bulk carrier to self- 
unloading shuttle vessel. As part of the conversion, NKK 
was required to build a materials handling system-- 
consisting essentially of a series of conveyor belts and a 
boom--that would be placed on the Rio Caroni to facilitate 
the movement of iron ore onto the vessel and its discharge 
from the vessel. NKK subcontracted the design and 
furnishing of the materials handling system to EDC, Inc., 
which was to provide NKK with engineering expertise, 
drawings and parts. In turn, NKK would then assemble the 
provided parts to complete the conversion of the Rio Caroni. 
See Appx. 119. 
 
One of the parts EDC contracted to supply was a boom 
cylinder, which formed part of the boom's hoisting 
mechanism. Because EDC was itself unable to build the 
boom cylinder, EDC subcontracted the manufacture of this 
part to the Sheffer Corporation. Exactly which party 
designed the boom cylinder is unclear from the record on 
appeal. The purchase order for the boom cylinder, which 
refers to a "Sheffer Hydraulic Boom Hoist Cylinder," 
indicates that Sheffer regularly of fered several standard 
boom cylinder models for sale to the public. See  Appx. 142. 
However, the numerous specifications in the purchase 
order--for example, the purchase or der stated that "blind 
or piston end of the cylinder to have pivot mount . . . 
suitable for 350 mm pin"--indicate that EDC pr ovided at 
least some special parameters with which Shef fer's cylinder 
was required to comply. See id. As such, the boom cylinder 
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appears to be a modified Sheffer cylinder , custom-built to 
EDC's specifications. 
 
On April 15, 1995, the Rio Caroni's new boom suddenly 
collapsed while the vessel was unloading ore onto the Boca 
Grande, damaging both vessels. An investigation by W alter 
Herbst, president of EDC, revealed that the boom's collapse 
was due to a sudden fracture of the steel r od-eye, a 
component of the boom cylinder that had been built for 
EDC by Sheffer. See Appx. 151. However, Herbst's report 
was not able to pinpoint the exact cause of the r od-eye's 
failure, giving ten possible reasons for it--including possible 
design and manufacturing defects. At the request of TFV, 
EDC arranged for metallurgical testing of the rod-eye by 
Professional Services Industries, Inc. (PSI) to determine the 
precise cause of the rod-eye's failur e. PSI determined that 
the rod-eye failed in a brittle manner, possibly due to its 
fabrication from an inferior grade of steel. See Appx. 161- 
62. Following PSI's analysis of the rod-eye, EDC refused to 
pay a monthly storage fee for the rod-eye. Consequently, 
the rod-eye was discarded by PSI prior to the 
commencement of this suit, and it cannot now be 
recovered. 
 
B. District Court Proceedings 
 
On August 21, 1996, TFV filed suit in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey against NKK, 
EDC and Sheffer, seeking an awar d of $3.6 million for the 
physical damage to its vessels, as well as compensation for 
economic losses attributed to the vessels' being out of 
operation. In its answer to TFV's complaint, EDC asserted 
a cross-claim against Sheffer, alleging that Sheffer should 
pay any judgment entered against EDC because it had 
improperly manufactured the rod-eye. The district court 
had subject matter jurisdiction over this cause pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1332. 
 
Through discovery, TFV learned that EDC was insured 
under a policy with Hartford. This Compr ehensive General 
Liability and Business Liability Policy provided a $2 million 
aggregate limit for business liability claims. On March 6, 
1998, TFV notified Hartford of the accident and pending 
litigation. (Thus, Hartford became awar e of the accident 
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approximately three years after the accident occurred and 
not until after this litigation was instituted.) On May 15, 
1998, EDC brought suit in New Jersey state court, seeking 
from Hartford coverage and/or a defense of TFV's suit. 
Hartford denied both coverage and a defense; thereafter, for 
reasons not reflected in the recor d on appeal, the state 
court action was dismissed. Hartford was then brought into 
the instant action as a third-party defendant by way of 
EDC's third-party complaint. In its thir d-party answer to 
this complaint, dated July 8, 1998, Hartford denied that its 
policy covered EDC for the losses sustained on TFV's 
vessels and refused to defend EDC in the pr esent action. 
See Appx. 46-53. 
 
On August 10, 1998, approximately one month after 
being joined in the present lawsuit, Hartfor d, along with the 
other parties to this suit, attended an all-day settlement 
conference before the magistrate judge assigned to this 
case. At the conference, TFV agreed to settle its claims 
against all parties for $1.85 million. During the settlement 
conference, the magistrate judge informed Hartford that it 
could settle on behalf of EDC for $750,000. If Hartford 
chose not to settle, the magistrate advised the participants 
that EDC was going to consent to judgment in the amount 
of $1 million and assign its rights under the insurance 
contract to TFV. At Hartford's r equest, the magistrate judge 
allowed it two weeks to consider which of the two options 
it would accept. 
 
Hartford chose not to settle on behalf of EDC. Instead, in 
a letter dated August 18, 1998, Hartford infor med EDC that 
it would now agree to provide EDC with a defense, subject 
to a reservation of rights as to coverage of the claim. See 
Appx. 377. On August 26, counsel for all parties 
participated in a telephone conference with the magistrate 
judge, during which the judge informed Hartfor d that, in 
spite of Hartford's offer to defend EDC, the parties had 
signed a settlement agreement. Under the final terms of the 
settlement, TFV received $500,000 from Sheffer and 
$350,000 from various parties, including NKK and the 
supplier of the steel used in the rod-eye's manufacture. The 
settlement also made EDC liable to TFV for $1 million. 
However, because EDC could not affor d to pay the $1 
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million settlement amount, it consented instead to a 
judgment against it in favor of TFV. TFV agr eed not to 
execute this judgment, and in exchange EDC assigned all of 
its claims against Hartford to TFV. 
 
Thus, following the settlement, TFV and Hartfor d were 
the only two parties remaining in this suit. TFV moved, and 
Hartford cross-moved, for summary judgment. The district 
court granted Hartford's motion for summary judgment, 
finding that the late notice of the accident voided coverage. 
The district court also found that Hartford suf fered 
substantial prejudice due to the late notice because EDC's 
consent to disposal of the rod-eye prevented Hartford from 
examining the rod-eye itself. The district court believed that 
Hartford was further prejudiced because the late notice 
prevented it from filing a cross-claim for indemnification 
against Sheffer. 
 
TFV appeals. We have appellate jurisdiction over both the 
grant of Hartford's summary judgment motion and the 
denial of TFV's motion. See 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
The decision below arises out of cross-motions for 
summary judgment. Such motions: 
 
       are no more than a claim by each side that it alone is 
       entitled to summary judgment, and the making of such 
       inherently contradictory claims does not constitute an 
       agreement that if one is rejected the other is 
       necessarily justified or that the losing party waives 
       judicial consideration and determination whether 
       genuine issues of material fact exist. 
 
Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 
1968). In addition, "when an appeal from a denial of 
summary judgment is raised in tandem with an appeal of 
an order granting a cross-motion for summary judgment, 
we have jurisdiction to review the propriety of the denial of 
summary judgment by the district court." Nazay v. Miller, 
949 F.2d 1323, 1328 (3d Cir. 1991). Our review of the 
district court's decision on the motions for summary 
judgment is plenary. See International Union, United Mine 
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Workers of America v. Racho Trucking Co., 897 F.2d 1248, 
1252 (3d Cir. 1990). We will uphold a grant (or reverse a 
denial) of summary judgment only when there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and a party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
 
Because there is no dispute that New Jersey law governs 
in this case, we do not question its application. See 
Newport Assocs. Development Co. v. The Travelers 
Indemnity Co. of Ill., 162 F.3d 789, 791 (3d Cir. 1998). 
Under New Jersey law, the words of an insurance contract 
are given their ordinary meaning, unless they are 
ambiguous. See 495 Corp. v. N.J. Ins. Underwriting Ass'n., 
430 A.2d 203, 206 (N.J. 1981). We test for ambiguity by 
asking whether the policy's phrasing is "so confusing that 
the average policyholder cannot make out the boundaries of 
coverage." Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788, 795 
(N.J. 1979). 
 
TFV presents two issues on appeal: (1) whether Hartford 
was appreciably prejudiced because it r eceived late 
notification of the accident and because the r od-eye was 
lost or destroyed and (2) whether the insurance contract 
between EDC and Hartford covered EDC's liability to TFV. 
We address these issues in turn. 
 
A. Late Notice 
 
The insurance contract between EDC and Hartfor d 
required that EDC notify Hartford pr omptly of any accident 
that might result in a claim: 
 
       E. LIABILITY AND MEDICAL EXPENSES GENERAL 
       CONDITIONS 
 
       2. Duties in the Event of Occurrence, Claim or Suit. 
 
       a. You must see to it that we are notified promptly 
       of an "occurrence" or an offense which may 
       result in a claim. 
 
       *** 
 
       b. If a claim is made or "suit" is br ought against 
       any insured, you must: 
 
       (1) Immediately record the specifics of the claim 
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       or "suit" and the date received; and 
 
       (2) Notify us as soon as practicable. 
 
       You must see to it that we receive a written notice of 
       the claim or "suit" as soon as practicable. 
 
Appx. 256. The insurance contract defines an "occurrence" 
as "an accident" and a "suit" as "a civil proceeding in which 
damages because of . . . `property damage' .. . to which 
this insurance applies are alleged." See  Appx. 260. Thus, 
the rod-eye failure qualifies as an"occurrence," and this 
cause qualifies as a "suit," as those ter ms are defined in the 
contract. Consequently, EDC was, upon learning of the 
accident, obligated to notify Hartford. 
 
Hartford argues--and the district court agreed--that 
Hartford cannot be liable to EDC because EDC did not 
provide Hartford with prompt notice of the accident, as 
required under the insurance contract. However, for an 
insurer to assert the defense of late notice under New 
Jersey law, the insurer must prove not only that it was 
given late notice of the accident (here, TFV does not dispute 
that its notice was late), but also that it suf fered 
appreciable prejudice as a result of the late notice. See 
Chemical Leaman Tank Lines v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co., 89 F.3d 976, 996 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that New 
Jersey law requires showing of appr eciable prejudice); 
Solvents Recovery Service of New England v. Midland Ins. 
Co., 526 A.2d 1112, 1114 (N.J. App. Div. 1987) (noting that 
insurer bears burden of proving appr eciable prejudice). New 
Jersey courts look to two factors in analyzing whether a 
party has suffered appreciable pr ejudice: (1) whether 
substantial rights have been irretrievably lost by virtue of 
the insured's failure to give timely notice; and (2) whether 
the likelihood of success of the insurer in defending against 
the underlying claim has been adversely affected. See 
Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, 89 F.3d at 996-97. 
 
Under New Jersey Law, mere conjecture or suspicions 
may not form the basis for establishing appr eciable 
prejudice. See Molyneaux v. Molyneaux, 553 A.2d 49, 54 
(N.J. App. Div. 1989). Indeed, "the insur er [must] establish 
more than the mere fact that it cannot employ its normal 
procedures in investigating and evaluating the claim, 
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[r]ather it must show that substantial rights have been 
irretrievably lost." Kitchnefsky v. National Rent-A-Fence of 
America, Inc., 88 F.Supp.2d 360, 368 (D.N.J. 2000) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). These 
rights "include . . . `the preparation and preservation of 
demonstrative and illustrative evidence such as vehicles or 
photographs, and the ability of experts to r econstruct the 
scene.' " J.T. Baker v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 1996 
WL 451316 (D.N.J. 1996) (quoting Morales v. National 
Grange Mutual Ins. Co., 176 N.J. Super. 347, 355 (Law Div. 
1980)). 
 
Hartford believes that the above standar ds are satisfied 
by two actions it was unable to take as a result of the late 
notice: (1) it was denied an opportunity to inspect the failed 
rod-eye assembly on its own and (2) it was denied an 
opportunity to assert a cross-claim against Sheffer, the 
manufacturer of the rod-eye. We address in turn, and 
reject, both of Hartford's prof fered grounds for finding 
substantial prejudice. 
 
Hartford first alleges that, if it only had r eceived prompt 
notice of the accident, it would have taken custody of the 
failed rod-eye assembly and undertaken its own full 
analysis of it. While it is true that the failed r od-eye has 
been irretrievably lost, it has been replaced by an 
independent professional metallurgist's comprehensive 
laboratory report that seemingly details all r elevant 
characteristics of the rod-eye at the time of failure. The rod- 
eye was fully tested by PSI, and Hartford has not stated any 
additional or different testing it would have pursued on its 
own had it had possession of the rod-eye. Instead, Hartford 
appears to argue that it need not show how it was 
prejudiced by loss of the rod-eye because, to its way of 
thinking, the loss of a piece of physical evidence will per se 
establish substantial prejudice. However , New Jersey law is 
not so generous; as noted, more than speculation and 
conjecture is required to establish substantial prejudice. 
Because Hartford has provided nothing beyond mere 
speculation, it has failed to show how it might have been 
appreciably prejudiced by its failur e to run its own tests on 
the rod-eye assembly. 
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Whether Hartford was prejudiced by its inability to fully 
pursue a cross-claim against Sheffer is a more difficult 
issue, but one that Hartford emphasized at oral argument. 
Hartford maintains that "EDC's breach of the notice 
provision of the Hartford policy also pr ejudiced Hartford by 
reason of EDC's failure to aggressively pursue a cross-claim 
for contractual indemnification from co-defendant Sheffer." 
Appellee's Br. at 20. There are several problems with this 
argument, not the least of which is the fact that an insurer 
who has not paid its insured's claim or pr ovided the 
insured with a defense has no right to obtain the benefit of 
the insured's claims against third parties. See Fireman's 
Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartfor d, 367 A.2d 864, 
868 (N.J. 1976); see also In re Joint Eastern & Southern 
Dist. Asbestos Lit., 78 F.3d 764, 779 (2d Cir. 1996). Here, 
Hartford received notice of the accident in March 1998 and 
was first sued under its policy with EDC in May 1998. 
Nonetheless, Hartford steadfastly refused coverage, or even 
a defense, to EDC until one week after a settlement was 
agreed to in August 1998. During the months following 
Hartford's initial notification of the accident, Hartford had 
ample opportunity to assist EDC, but turned down the 
chance to do so. Therefore, Hartfor d lost the right to pursue 
a cross-claim against Sheffer as a r esult of its own inaction, 
not by virtue of EDC's action. 
 
Hartford's real problem appears to lie with EDC's 
decision to settle this case, thereby extinguishing its cross- 
claim against Sheffer. However, under New Jersey law, 
when an insurer refuses to defend its insured, the insured 
is free to settle with third parties, and the settlement may 
be enforced against the insurer. See Griggs v. Bertram, 443 
A.2d 163, 171-72 (N.J. 1982).1 Thus, EDC was free to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We recognize that Hartford of fered to defend EDC one week after the 
settlement was agreed to. However, this fact is irrelevant to our 
discussion. Even if Hartford had been allowed to defend EDC, subject to 
a reservation of rights, EDC would have been able to enter the same 
settlement, for the attorney hired by an insurance company represents 
the insured, not the insurer. See Petty v. General Accident Fire & Life 
Assurance Corp., 365 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir. 1966). And "[w]hile the 
insurer is not compelled to disregard its own interests in representing or 
defending an insured, the insured's inter ests must necessarily come 
first." Lieberman v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 419 A.2d 417, 422- 
23 (N.J. 1980). Accordingly, if an insur ed wants to settle (as did EDC), 
the attorney provided by the insur er must do so, even if the insurer 
objects. 
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settle, subject to limited oversight by Hartfor d. Of course, a 
settlement that is unreasonable in amount or entered into 
in bad faith is not enforceable against Hartfor d, but 
Hartford bears the ultimate burden of showing such 
frailties in the settlement. Griggs v. Bertram , 443 A.2d at 
174. Hartford has not met that burden. 
 
Here, EDC was justified, and perhaps even wise, to settle 
in the manner that it did. Under its contract with NKK, 
EDC warranted that it would provide equipment (including 
the rod-eye) that is "of merchantable quality, free from all 
defects in design, material and workmanship . . . ." Appx. 
125. EDC was apparently liable, therefor e, to NKK for 
supplying a defective product, even if the defect was due 
perhaps to Sheffer's manufacturing err or. Hartford believes, 
however, that the indemnification clause in the boom 
cylinder purchase order clearly pr ovided that Sheffer would 
fully indemnify EDC for any damages arising out of the 
defectiveness of the product. The clause r eads: "[i]f this 
Purchase Order involves work to be per formed by you at a 
job site, you, by the acceptance of this Pur chase Order . . . 
agree to indemnify and save EDC incorporated against all 
claims for damages to persons or property arising out of the 
execution of the work." Appx. 140. The indemnification 
clause is not as broad as Hartford claims, for it only 
provides for indemnification when damages arise "out of the 
execution of . . . work" done at a job site. The damage 
caused by the failed rod-eye does not seem to meet these 
conditions. Thus, the purchase order's indemnification 
clause does not appear to provide EDC with any 
contractual indemnification. This being the case, Hartford 
has not shown that settlement was unreasonable because 
of the indemnification clause in the contract between EDC 
and Sheffer. 
 
Of course, Sheffer might nonetheless have emer ged from 
a trial with a substantial obligation of its own, arising out 
of a legal duty distinct from the above indemnification 
clause. For example, EDC's cross-claim against Sheffer 
contains the allegation that Sheffer failed to exercise due 
care in manufacturing the rod-eye. EDC might also have 
pursued an express or implied warranty claim against 
Sheffer. If ultimately proven at trial, these allegations might 
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have led to a significant amount of contribution from 
Sheffer. However, there is no guarantee that EDC could 
successfully prove these allegations at trial. Such 
uncertainty is a classic reason for settling, and here the 
settlement amounts paid by each party appear to 
reasonably reflect the parties' various responsibilities for 
designing, manufacturing and installing the r od-eye: TFV 
agreed to settle a $3.6 million claim for only $1.85 million, 
and of that amount, EDC was responsible for $1 million, 
Sheffer for $500,000 and other parties for the remaining 
$350,000. 
 
Hartford has shown no evidence that the above amounts 
were somehow the result of collusive conduct or bad faith 
dealings between the parties. Indeed, the best ar gument 
Hartford could muster at oral argument was an appeal to 
equity, claiming that it only had two weeks to consider a 
settlement that arose out of a complex case involving 
thousands of pages of documents. Hartford's ar gument 
fails, however, because Hartford certainly had more than 
two weeks to familiarize itself with this case. EDCfirst sued 
Hartford over the insurance policy in May 1998. At that 
time, Hartford learned the facts of this case and formulated 
a litigation strategy based upon them, for Hartfor d denied 
that its policy obligated it to defend or cover EDC--a 
determination that required a familiarity with the facts and 
insurance policy. Consequently, Hartford had ample time to 
learn the facts and legal issues in this case and cannot now 
claim that the settlement is unfair because it was only 
allowed two weeks to make a settlement decision that all 
other parties were apparently able to make in one day. For 
these reasons, we find that the settlement is reasonable 
and the result of good faith dealings between the parties. 
Thus, Hartford has failed to show appreciable prejudice 
arising from the late notice of EDC's claim that it received. 
 
B. Contract Coverage 
 
Having found that Hartford was not appr eciably 
prejudiced by the late notice, we turn now to the question 
whether the insurance contract provides coverage of the 
rod-eye failure. The contract between EDC and Hartford 
provides up to $2 million of business liability coverage.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The relevant provision of the contract states that "[Hartford] will pay 
those sums that [EDC] becomes legally obligated to pay as damages 
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However, the contract also contains several standard 
exclusions. 
 
The first relevant exclusion addresses the "products- 
completed operations hazard."3  Under this exclusion, the 
contract exempts from coverage any damage arising after 
the product or work leaves the insured's hands. Here, for 
example, the "products-completed operations hazard" 
exclusion would act to prevent coverage of damage arising 
from the rod-eye once the rod-eye has left EDC's control. 
However, under the EDC policy, the "pr oducts-completed 
operations hazard" exclusion does not apply when the work 
out of which the damage arises was perfor med by a 
subcontractor. 
 
The second relevant exclusion, entitled "Exclusion-- 
Engineers and Architect Professional Liability," generally 
provides that insurance coverage will not extend to damage 
arising out of various professional services, such as product 
design.4 However, as noted by TFV, "[t]he exclusion for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
because of `bodily injury,' `property damage,' `personal injury' or 
`advertising injury' to which this insurance applies." Appx. 247 (Business 
Liability Coverage Form A.1.a). The $2 million limit is provided on page 
5 of the Spectrum Policy Declarations in EDC's insurance contract with 
Hartford. See Appx. 213. 
 
3. The "products-completed operations hazard" coverage exclusion states 
that the insurance contract does not extend coverage to " `Property 
damage' to `your work' arising out of it or any part of it and included in 
the `products-completed operations hazar d.' " However, this coverage 
exclusion does not apply "if the damaged work or the work out of which 
the damage arises was performed on your behalf by a subcontractor." 
Appx. at 252. (Bus. Liab. Coverage Form. B.1.m.) 
 
The contract defines "products-completed operations hazard" to 
"include[ ] all `bodily injury' and`property damage' arising out of `your 
product' or `your work' except: (1) Pr oducts that are still in your 
physical 
possession; or (2) Work that has not yet been completed or abandoned." 
Appx. 260. B.10.a. 
 
4. In full, the exclusion states that: 
 
       This insurance does not apply to `bodily injury,'`property damage,' 
       `personal injury' or `advertising injury' arising out of the 
rendering or 
       failure to render any professional services by or for you, 
including: 
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professional services is . . . appropriately associated with a 
specialized knowledge and a mental or intellectual 
endeavor, not production, manufactur e or supply of goods 
and manufacturing." Appellant's Br. at 28 (citing Ostrager 
& Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes, 
S 7.02(b)(6) (10th Ed. 1999)). As such, the exclusion for 
professional services precludes coverage only if the damage 
arises out of a faulty design (either by EDC or Shef fer), as 
opposed to faulty manufacture. 
 
We are thus left with the following after reading the 
relevant provisions of the insurance contract. The general 
liability provisions of the contract clearly cover the damage 
arising from the defective rod-eye: EDC has become legally 
obligated to pay damages because of property damage 
arising out of a product that it supplied and at least 
partially designed. However, two contract exclusions in the 
policy must also be considered. Under one exclusion (for 
"products-completed operations hazar d"), the contract 
provides coverage if the accident arose fr om a defect caused 
by Sheffer's manufacture of the rod-eye. Under the other 
exclusion (for "engineers and architects pr ofessional 
liability"), the contract provides coverage only if the 
accident is not attributable to a defect in EDC's or Sheffer's 
design of the rod-eye. Thus, Hartfor d's liability under the 
insurance contract turns on whether the accident was 
caused by a design defect, which would preclude coverage, 
or a manufacturing defect, which would not pr eclude 
coverage. 
 
All of this leaves us with the task of trying to identify the 
defect in the rod-eye that caused it to fail and the party 
responsible for this defect. Perhaps because they both 
believed that this case would be decided on the issue 
whether there was appreciable prejudice, as it was in the 
district court, neither party has developed the r ecord or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (1) The preparing, approving, or failing to prepare or approve 
maps, 
       drawings, opinions, reports, surveys, change or ders, designs or 
       specifications; and (2) Supervisory, inspection or engineering 
       services. 
 
Appx. 269. 
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presented arguments sufficiently for us to determine fully 
the cause of the rod-eye's failure. Indeed, EDC's own initial 
report of the accident, dated April 1995, lists ten possible 
causes of failure, including both design and manufacturing 
defects. See Appx. 151. The laboratory r eport from PSI 
indicates that the rod-eye's failure may be due to the use of 
an inferior grade of steel in the manufactur e of the rod-eye, 
but the report is not entirely clear on its face and requires 
expert testimony to explicate it. See Appx. 159-62. As such, 
the precise reason for the rod-eye's failure is not apparent 
from the record on appeal. 
 
Further, from the record, it is not even clear who 
specified how, and from what materials, the r od-eye should 
be built. For example, from the purchase order, which 
refers to a "Sheffer Hydraulic Boom Hoist Cylinder" and 
then provides detailed specifications, it appears that Sheffer 
built a custom version of a conventional hydraulic cylinder 
to EDC's specifications. In addition, the r ecord does not 
reveal whether EDC specified the particular type of steel 
which failed (in which case the type of steel might be 
considered a design defect) and, if it did, whether Sheffer 
manufactured the rod-eye using the steel specified or, 
alternatively, a steel of lower quality (in which case the type 
of steel might be considered a manufacturing defect). 
 
Accordingly, because the record is inadequately 
developed, we remand for trial (or possibly a showing on 
summary judgment) on the issue whether the r od-eye 
failure was caused by EDC's or Sheffer's design, which 
would presumably preclude coverage under the insurance 
contract, or Sheffer's manufacturing, which would allow 
coverage under the insurance contract. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we VACA TE the judgment of the 
district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
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